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Abstract
Introduction Medication errors can have serious consequences for patients. To prevent the occurrence of medication errors 
in clinical practice, safety concerns may be included in the risk management plan and subsequently be addressed with routine 
and/or additional risk minimisation measures.
Objective This study aims to describe safety concerns around medication errors and the risk minimisation measures for 
centrally authorised products in the European Union.
Methods All safety concerns included in the risk management plans of originator centrally authorised products, authorised 
between 1 January, 2010 and 31 December, 2017, were collected from the European Public Assessment Report registry. 
Medication error safety concerns were categorised by Anatomical Therapeutic Classification code, year of authorisation, 
type of medication error and type of risk minimisation measure.
Results During the study period, 311 centrally authorised products were approved, of which 84 had at least one medication 
error safety concern. The proportion of centrally authorised products with medication error safety concerns showed varia-
tion between 2010 and 2017 ranging from 15.2% to 36.4%. In total, 95 medication error safety concerns were identified. The 
type of medication error was highly variable, drug administration error was listed most frequently (n = 17). For 27 out of 95 
medication error safety concerns, corresponding to 23 centrally authorised products, additional risk minimisation measures 
were required. All additional risk minimisation measures consisted of educational material targeted at healthcare profession-
als (85.2%) and/or patients (51.9%). For 78.3% of centrally authorised products with additional risk minimisation measures 
for medication errors, studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the additional risk minimisation measures were agreed upon.
Conclusions Medication error safety concerns were listed for almost a quarter of centrally authorised products approved 
during the study period. Further research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness and continued need for additional risk 
minimisation measures for medication errors.
Key Points 
Over a quarter of medicines authorised in the Euro-
pean Union have medication errors as an important risk 
included in the risk management plan.
Medication errors frequently require additional risk 
minimisation measures.
Studies are needed to confirm the effectiveness of meas-
ures implemented to minimise the risk of medication 
errors.
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1 Introduction
In November 1999, the US Institutes of Medicine released 
a report titled “To err is human”, which concluded that 
between 44,000 and 98,000 patients in the USA died each 
year as a result of preventable medical errors [1]. Vary-
ing numbers of patients experiencing medication errors 
(MEs) have been described. In a recent report, the World 
Health Organization has marked MEs as a leading cause of 
avoidable harm to patients [2]. Medication errors are “an 
unintended failure in the drug treatment process that leads 
to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to the patient” [3]. 
Numerous heterogeneous factors have been described as a 
cause for the occurrence of MEs, ranging from e.g., pho-
netic (sound-a-like) and orthographic (look-a-like) medica-
tion names to confusion relating to appropriate dosage and 
route of administration to time pressure on medical person-
nel [4]. In view of the many different factors associated with 
MEs, reducing the risk of MEs by one single intervention is 
often not achievable. In addition, many stakeholders such 
as pharmaceutical companies, regulators, healthcare profes-
sionals (HCPs), patients and their caretakers have a role in 
the prevention of MEs. Therefore, strategies to minimise 
MEs should include all stakeholders and the need to address 
the different causes and phases of product development and 
the post-licensure treatment process. Pharmaceutical com-
panies, responsible for product development and design, 
should consider possibilities to minimise MEs as early as 
possible in the development process.
If MEs are identified during the clinical development 
phase, these should preferably be resolved before the medi-
cine enters the market. For example, if reconstitution and 
preparation of the final product are complicated and pose 
challenges already in the strictly controlled environment 
of the clinical trial, the pharmaceutical company should 
improve product preparation, whenever feasible, because the 
risk in daily practice might be even larger. In 2015, the Euro-
pean Medicines Agency (EMA) released guidance describ-
ing common areas of risks to be considered by industry and 
regulators before authorisation [5, 6]. It is highlighted here 
that the focus regarding MEs should not only be on within-
product risks but also between-product risks, such as name 
similarity with already licensed products. In the European 
Union (EU), the Committee for Medicinal Products for 
Human Use Name Review Group evaluates the similarity 
of new product names with already approved products to 
limit confusion between products [7]. Despite pre-marketing 
efforts, not all ME risks can be completely eliminated, e.g., 
if multiple strengths of the same product are on the market 
there will be the potential for confusion between strengths. 
Routine risk minimisation through warnings and instruc-
tions in the Summary of Product Characteristics (SmPC) 
and patient leaflet, or colour coding of the product name or 
dosages on packaging may be sufficient to minimise the risk 
of MEs. If routine measures are not expected to be sufficient 
to minimise the risk of MEs, additional risk minimisation 
measures (aRMMs) should be implemented.
Since 2012, an EU Risk Management Plan (EU-RMP) is 
mandatory for all medicinal products newly licensed in the 
EU. The EU-RMP describes the knowledge of the safety 
profile of a product at the moment of approval and provides 
a plan for areas that need further identification, characteri-
sation and/or risk minimisation [8, 9]. The EU-RMP stimu-
lates a pro-active approach towards risk management and 
minimisation. The EU-RMP is a dynamic document that is 
updated continuously during the lifetime of the medicinal 
product to reflect newly available information. A discussion 
on the risk of MEs is a mandatory part of the EU RMP [10] 
and, if appropriate, MEs can be included as an important 
risk in the RMP. In addition, pharmacovigilance activities 
and aRMMs to prevent MEs can be proposed [11, 12].
Limited summary information is available concerning 
risk minimisation measures (RMMs) regarding MEs. Rubino 
and Artime reported in an overview of aRMMs that MEs are 
among the risks most frequently addressed with aRMMs 
[13]: in their study over the period 2005–2015, a total of 32 
centrally authorised products (CAPs) required aRMMs for 
MEs. A study by the UK Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency showed that MEs represented almost a 
quarter of the risks described in RMPs in the UK [14]. How-
ever, both studies lacked information regarding the specific 
medications and how these MEs were identified. Therefore, 
a more detailed review of RMMs for MEs is warranted.
In this study, we review the important risks for CAPs in 
the European Economic Area (EEA) licensed between 2010 
and 2017 regarding MEs, including the routine and aRMMs 
as laid down in the EU-RMP of these products at the time 
of licensing.
2  Methods
2.1  Study Design
We performed a cross-sectional study including all originator 
CAPs authorised in the EEA between 1 January, 2010 and 
31 December, 2017. Applications for generic, biosimilar and 
hybrid products were excluded, as these are expected to fol-
low the originator product in the design of their EU-RMP and 
the aRMM. In the EU, medicines can be authorised through 
centralised or decentralised procedures. Application through 
the centralised procedure leads to a marketing authorisation 
for the entire EEA, whereas for decentralised procedures the 
applicant can choose to have the product approved in selected 
EEA countries. The majority of originator medicines are 
authorised through the centralised procedure [15].
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2.2  Data Collection
Data were collected from the European Public Assessment 
Reports (EPARs) published on the website of the EMA 
(http://www.ema.europ a.eu). The EPAR of the initial appli-
cation procedure includes a summary of the EU-RMP from 
which all safety concerns (i.e. both relating to MEs and oth-
ers) were extracted as described before by Francisca et al. 
[11]. The Summary of Safety Concerns describes the impor-
tant identified and potential risks and the missing informa-
tion of the medicinal product based on knowledge at the time 
of the authorisation.
2.3  Outcome and Covariates
For each medicinal product included in the study, the fol-
lowing data were collected from the EPAR: date of authori-
sation, Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) code, 
pharmaceutical form, safety concerns, the categories for 
the Summary of Safety Concerns (important identified risk, 
important potential risk or missing information) and how 
MEs are addressed (routine and aRMMs, and studies inves-
tigating the effectiveness of aRMMs for MEs).
All risks included in the Summary of Safety Concerns 
regarding MEs were translated manually into the most 
appropriate Preferred Terms (PTs) based on the Medical 
Dictionary for Regulatory Activities  (MedDRA®)1 termi-
nology. Then, all ME safety concerns that are in the narrow 
standard MedDRA query from MedDRA 19.0 were included 
in the study. The standard MedDRA query is a collection of 
PTs that are assembled to support the identification of MEs 
in MedDRA-coded databases. The full PT list for the ME 
standard MedDRA query is provided in the Electronic Sup-
plementary Material (ESM). The EU-RMPs were reviewed 
in detail to identify the exact type of error that was being 
referred to for safety concerns defined as the general term 
‘medication error’. If a ‘medication error’ PT was trans-
lated to two or more PTs, then each of these was counted 
separately in the analysis. Where the type of error could 
not be established based on the information in the EPAR, 
the first approved full EU-RMP document was retrieved for 
more information. Finally, ME safety concern PTs were cat-
egorised into nine groups based on the nature of the MEs, 
according to MedDRA higher level terms (as per Table 1).
In the summary of safety concerns in the EU-RMP, safety 
concerns are classified into three categories: important iden-
tified risks, important potential risks and missing informa-
tion according to the guideline on good pharmacovigilance 
practices Module V revision 2 [10]. As specified in good 
pharmacovigilance practices Module V revision 1, impor-
tant identified risks are defined as “untoward occurrences 
for which there is adequate evidence of an association with 
the medicinal product of interest”, important potential risks 
are “untoward occurrences for which there is some basis for 
suspicion of an association with the medicinal product of 
interest but where this association has not been confirmed” 
and missing information is defined as “gaps in knowledge 
about a medicinal product, related to safety or use in par-
ticular patient populations, which could be clinically sig-
nificant” [16]. All RMMs are either routine or additional. 
Routine RMMs are categorised by a section of the SmPC in 
which specific information is included to address ME risks. 
An overview of all SmPC sections is provided in Table 2. 
Table 1  Preferred Terms (PTs) are classified into groups as per Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities  (MedDRA®) higher level term 
(HLT) classification
HLT PT
Accidental exposures Accidental exposure to product
Administration Accidental overdose, contraindicated drug administered, drug administration error, inap-
propriate schedule of drug administration, incorrect dose administered, incorrect drug 
administration rate, incorrect product formulation administered, incorrect route of drug 
administration, wrong drug administered, wrong patient received medication
Confusion Product dosage from confusion, product name confusion
Dispensing Drug dispensing error
General Device use error, drug titration error, medication error, multiple use of single-use prod-
uct, wrong dose, wrong technique in product usage process
Monitoring Medication monitoring error, therapeutic drug monitoring analysis incorrectly performed
Preparation Product preparation error
Prescribing Drug prescribing error
Selection Product selection error
1 MedDRA® is the international medicinal terminology developed 
under the auspices of the International Council on Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for 
Human Use.
 C. E. Hoeve et al.
Data regarding other routine RMMs (e.g. design of product 
packaging, prescription status) were not collected from the 
EPAR, as these data are not structurally available. Additional 
risk minimisation measures were categorised as educational 
materials for HCPs, educational materials for patients, con-
trolled access, controlled distribution or pregnancy preven-
tion programmes [17]. The need for risk minimisation effec-
tiveness studies is described in the EU-RMP. Information 
on the need for effectiveness studies was obtained from the 
EPAR, or if not provided, from the EU-PAS registry.
2.4  Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to present frequency data. 
All analyses were performed in Microsoft Excel 2010.
3  Results
Between 1 January, 2010 and 31 December, 2017, a total of 
311 CAPs were authorised in the EEA through the central-
ised procedure. In total, 4668 safety concerns were included 
in the EPARs of these products at the time of the marketing 
authorisation (both ME and non-ME safety concerns). Of 
the 311 CAPs, 84 products (27.0%) had at least one safety 
concern related to MEs. The proportion of CAPs approved 
with a ME safety concern showed variations between 2010 
and 2017, ranging from 15.2% in 2011 to 36.4% in 2015 (see 
Fig. 1). For the 84 products with ME safety concerns, a total 
of 95 separate ME safety concerns were identified.
Table 2  Structure of the European Union Summary of Product Char-
acteristics (SmPC)
SmPC section Section topic
1 Name of the medicinal product
2 Qualitative and quantitative composition
3 Pharmaceutical form
4 Clinical particulars
4.1 Therapeutic indications
4.2 Posology and method of administration
4.3 Contraindications
4.4 Special warnings and precautions for use
4.5 Interactions with other medicinal products 
and other forms of interaction
4.6 Fertility, pregnancy and lactation
4.7 Effects on ability to drive and use machines
4.8 Undesirable effects
4.9 Overdose
5 Pharmacological properties
5.1 Pharmacodynamics properties
5.2 Pharmacokinetic properties
5.3 Preclinical safety data
6 Pharmaceutical particulars
6.1 List of excipients
6.2 Incompatibilities
6.3 Shelf life
6.4 Special precautions for storage
6.5 Nature and contents of container
6.6 Special precautions for disposal and other 
handling of the product
Fig. 1  Number of medication 
error (ME) centrally authorised 
products (CAPs) approved 
yearly with and without ME 
safety concerns
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3.1  Type of Medication Error Safety Concerns
After translation of all 95 ME safety concerns to MedDRA 
PTs, it was observed that ‘medication error’ was the PT used 
most often to describe ME safety concerns (50; 52.6% of all 
ME safety concerns). Based on the information provided in 
the EPAR, 43 of the 50 ME safety concerns could be further 
classified into a PT more specific than ‘medication error’. 
This resulted in a total of 103 PTs. Finally, as shown in 
Table 3, ‘drug administration error’ was the most frequently 
reported safety concern (n = 17), followed by ‘product dos-
age form confusion’ (n = 10) and ‘product preparation error’ 
(n = 9). For seven of the 50 safety concerns translated to 
the PT ‘medication error’, no additional information on the 
ME safety concerns could be identified in the EPAR or in 
the fully approved EU-RMP. Therefore, it remains unclear 
what exactly the risk of ME entails for these products. Eight 
of the 103 ME safety concerns also described the clinical 
consequence of the ME.
3.2  Level of Evidence for Medication Error Safety 
Concerns
Of all ME safety concerns, 10.5% were categorised in the 
RMP as important identified risks, 82.1% were categorised 
as important potential risks and 2.1% were categorised as 
missing information (the remaining 5.3% of safety concerns 
were not categorised in the RMP). Medication error safety 
concerns classified as important identified risks required 
aRMM in 70%, important potential risks required aRMM 
in 21.8% and for ME safety concerns classified as missing 
information, no aRMM was required.
3.3  Type of Medicinal Products
As presented in Table 4, blood and blood-forming organs 
products had ME safety concerns most often (18 of 84 prod-
ucts), followed by anti-infectives for systemic use (15 of 
84 products) and antineoplastic and immunomodulating 
agents (13 of 84 products). Furthermore, when compared 
to the overall number of CAPs authorised in each ATC 
group, medicines for blood and blood-forming organs most 
frequently had ME safety concerns, as 62.1% of products 
authorised in this ATC group had at least one ME safety 
concern (Table 4). Other ATC groups with a high rate of 
products with ME safety concerns were medicines for sen-
sory organs (60.0%) and systemic hormonal preparations 
(excluding sex hormones and insulins, 50.0%). When con-
sidering pharmaceutical formulations, it was observed that 
more than half (53.6%) of the products with ME safety con-
cerns concerned injections or infusions.
3.4  Routine Risk Minimisation Measures
The SmPC sections most frequently used to address risks 
of MEs were sections 4.2 (posology and method of admin-
istration), 4.4 (special warnings and precautions for use), 
4.9 (overdose) and 6.6 (special precautions for disposal) 
(Table 5). Per higher level term group, different SmPC 
sections were chosen to minimise the risk of MEs. Safety 
concerns relating to preparation errors had the highest 
number of SmPC references per safety concern (2.2), and 
were often warned for in sections 4.1 (33% of preparation 
errors), 4.2 (56% of preparation error safety concerns), 4.4 
(56% of preparation errors) and 6.6 (44% of preparation 
errors). Safety concerns relating to accidental exposures 
were most frequently covered in section 6.6 (63% of acci-
dental exposure safety concerns), followed by sections 4.2 
and 4.4 (both 50% of accidental exposure safety concerns). 
Safety concerns relating to prescribing errors were most 
Table 3  Description of the medication error safety concerns
CAPS centrally authorised products, PTs Preferred Terms
a These numbers are obtained after re-categorization of ‘medica-
tion error’ safety concerns. One safety concern may be translated 
into multiple PTs as a medication error may relate to multiple treat-
ment stages. Therefore, the 95 safety concerns identified for 84 CAPs 
resulted in 103 PTs
Updated PTs Frequencya
Accidental exposure to product 8
Accidental overdose 4
Contraindicated drug administered 2
Device use error 6
Drug administration error 17
Drug dispensing error 1
Drug prescribing error 1
Drug titration error 1
Inappropriate schedule of drug administration 3
Incorrect dose administered 7
Incorrect drug administration rate 1
Incorrect product formulation administered 1
Incorrect route of drug administration 3
Labelled drug-drug interaction medication error 5
Medication error 7
Medication monitoring error 1
Multiple use of single-use product 3
Product dosage form confusion 10
Product name confusion 1
Product preparation error 9
Product selection error 1
Wrong dose 3
Wrong drug administered 3
Wrong patient received medication 1
Wrong technique in product usage process 4
Total 103
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frequently covered in sections 4.3 and 4.5 of the SmPC 
(both 67% of prescribing error safety concerns). The single 
safety concern relating to product selection errors was cov-
ered in section 4.4 of the SmPC only. All other ME groups 
were most frequently covered in SmPC sections 4.2.
3.5  Additional Risk Minimisation Measures
During the study period, 23 of the 84 products received 
aRMMs for 27 ME safety concerns. The rate of aRMMs 
for ME safety concerns was higher than for the remaining 
non-ME safety concerns (28.4% vs. 7.5%). The proportion 
of ME safety concerns for which aRMM was implemented 
Table 4  Centrally authorised products (CAPs) with and without medication error (ME) safety concerns per Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
Classification System (ATC) group
a Products presented in bold had additional risk minimisation measures in place for MEs
ATC group CAPs with ME 
safety concerns 
(n = 84)
CAPs without ME 
safety concerns 
(n = 227)
% of CAPs with 
ME safety con-
cerns
CAPs with  MEsa
A—alimentary tract and metabolism 8 29 21.6 Fiasp®, Kolbam®,  Revestive®, 
 Ryzodeg®, Strensiq®, Tresiba®, 
 Trulicity®, Vimizim®
B—blood and blood forming organs 18 11 62.1 Afstyla®,  Alprolix®, Cinryze®, 
 Elocta®,  Evarrest®,  Iblias®, 
 Idelvion®,  Kovaltry®, Lixiana®, 
 NovoEight®, NovoThirteen®, 
 Nuwiq®, Obizur®,  Raplixa®, 
 Respreeza®, Uptravi®,  VeraSeal®, 
 Voncento®
C—cardiovascular system 4 9 30.8 Adempas®,  Brinavess®, Glybera®, 
Hemangiol®
D—dermatologicals 2 4 33.3 Mirvaso®, Scenesse®
G—genito urinary system and sex 
hormones
1 7 12.5 Silodyx®
H—systemic hormonal prepara-
tions, excluding sex hormones and 
insulins
2 2 50.0 Natpar®, Somatropin  Biopartners®
J—anti-infectives for systemic use 15 33 31.3 Eviplera®,  Exviera®, Fluenz  Tetra®, 
Gardasil  9®,  Genvoya®,  HyQvia®, 
 Imvanex®,  Nimenrix®, Pan-
demic influenza vaccine H5N1 
 AstraZeneca®,  Sirturo®,  Stribild®, 
 Victrelis®,  Vitekta®,  Zavicefta®, 
 Zerbaxa®
L—antineoplastic and immunomodu-
lating agents
13 82 13.7 Blincyto®,  Cabometyx®,  Cometriq®, 
Farydak®, Imlygic®, Kadcyla®, 
 Lynparza®,  Onivyde®,  Qarziba®, 
 Teysuno®,  Tookad®,  Unituxin®, 
 Venclyxto®
M—musculo-skeletal system 3 4 42.9 Krystexxa®, Spherox®, Xiapex®
N—nervous system 2 19 9.5 Ionsys®,  Sycrest®
P—antiparasitic products, insecti-
cides and repellents
0 1 0.0 –
R—respiratory system 3 9 25.0 Colobreathe®, Eklira  Genuair®, Seebri 
 Breezhaler®
S—sensory organs 6 4 60.0 Cystadrops®,  Eylea®, Holoclar®, 
 Ikervis®,  Jetrea®,  Omidria®
V—various 6 10 37.5 EndolucinBeta®, Lutathera®, 
 Lymphoseek®,  Scintimun®, SomaKit 
 TOC®,  Tybost®
Not assigned yet 1 3 25.0 Viekirax®
Total 84 227 27.0
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was variable over calendar time, ranging from 7.7% in 
2016 to 54.5% in 2012 (Fig. 2). For all 23 products, aRMM 
included educational material that targeted HCPs in 85.2% 
and patients in 51.9% (Fig. 3). For eight of the 23 products 
(referring to ten safety concerns), educational material tar-
geted both HCPs and patients. In addition to educational 
material, other aRMMs were requested for four products 
(referring to five safety concerns). Controlled access was 
requested for three products to address the following four 
ME safety concerns: risks of exposure of HCPs and close 
associates/transmission to third parties (n = 1), risks asso-
ciated with (unintended) re-administration (n = 1), risk of 
administering the drug to the wrong patient (n = 1), and 
risk of dosing errors in the titration phase (n = 1). Con-
trolled distribution was requested for one product to pre-
vent accidental exposure of HCPs: an oncolytic immuno-
therapy indicated for the treatment of melanoma. It should 
be noted that the controlled distribution programme for 
this product is not related solely to the ME safety concern, 
but also to other safety concerns. The controlled distribu-
tion programme aims to minimise inappropriate handling 
and administration of the product and also aims to mini-
mise the risk of damage to the product through inappropri-
ate storing [18].
Table 5  Summary of Product Characteristics (SmPC) sections listed as routine risk minimisation measures for medication errors
MedDRA HLT 2 3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.6 Number of SCsa
Number of 
references per SC
Accidental exposures 0 0 1 4 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 2.0
Administraon errors 1 0 2 29 1 22 4 1 9 1 1 0 0 0 7 45 1.7
General errors 0 1 1 16 1 6 1 3 3 0 0 1 1 2 7 24 1.8
Dispensing errors 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.0
Prescribing errors 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2.0
Monitoring errors 0 0 0 2 8 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1.9
Confusion errors 2 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 1.0
Preparaon errors 0 0 3 5 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 2.2
Selecon errors 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.0
Total 3 1 7 65 10 42 13 4 17 1 1 1 1 3 24 111 1.7
HLT higher level term, MedDRA® Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities, SC safety concern
a As a SC may be included in more than one SmPC section and be classified into more than one HLT, the total number adds up to more than 95 
SCs. SmPC sections never used are not included in the table. Values are distributed from high (dark red) to low (dark green). Dark red if the 
SmPC section has been used > 25 times to warn for the specific medication error. Dark green if the SmPC section was never used to warn for the 
specific medication error
Fig. 2  Medication error (ME) 
safety concerns with and with-
out additional risk minimisation 
measures (aRMM) per market-
ing authorisation year
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3.6  Effectiveness of Risk Minimisation Measures
A total of 29 studies to analyse the effectiveness of aRMMs for 
ME safety concerns were listed in the EPARs for 18 products 
(78.3% of products with aRMMs for ME safety concerns). 
For the remaining five products, no effectiveness studies 
were described. Multiple studies may have been requested 
for one safety concern or CAP. Different designs were cho-
sen for analysis of effectiveness. Registry studies were listed 
most frequently to analyse the effectiveness of aRMMs for 
MEs (n = 9). Other studies were described in the EPAR as fol-
lows: non-interventional observational studies not otherwise 
specified (n = 6), analysis of spontaneous reports (n = 5), sur-
veys (n = 5), clinical trials (n = 4) and a drug utilisation study 
(n = 1). In two cases, the studies were primarily designed to 
investigate the effectiveness of aRMMs for MEs and, in the 
remaining 27 cases, the studies aimed to review the effective-
ness of RMMs for multiple safety concerns simultaneously. 
Of the 68 ME safety concerns that did not require aRMMs, 
13 were studied further in post-marketing studies. This was 
achieved through multiple study designs: drug utilisation stud-
ies (n = 5), disease registries (n = 3), a survey (n = 1) and obser-
vational studies not otherwise specified (n = 6). Five studies 
focused only on characterising the risk of a ME, whereas the 
remaining eight studies were general investigations into the 
post-marketing safety profile of the drug.
4  Discussion
We observed that more than a quarter of the newly author-
ised medicines in the EU between 2010 and 2017 had ME 
safety concerns at the time of licensing. The high rate of 
products with ME safety concerns in this period may be 
due to several reasons. First, this high rate of products may 
reflect a high awareness of the seriousness and importance 
of MEs and the need to minimise these risks [5, 6]. In 
recent years, several actions have been taken by the EMA to 
increase awareness of MEs and to provide tools to reduce the 
risk of MEs, e.g. a stakeholder workshop on MEs, a Com-
mittee for Medicinal Products for Human Use opinion paper 
and release of two good practice guides (one on recording, 
coding, reporting and assessment of MEs, and one on risk 
minimisation and prevention of MEs) [3, 6, 19]. Second, 
it is also possible that this high proportion is owing to the 
authorisation of products with high complexity in recon-
stitution and/or administration. It has been reported that 
products for intravenous use are associated with the highest 
complexity and highest risk of harm [20]. In addition, it has 
been reported that intravenous administration leads to the 
most serious outcomes from MEs [21]. This is in line with 
our data where we observed that more than half the CAPs 
with ME safety concerns were injections and infusions, or 
other specialised pharmaceutical products such as implants 
Fig. 3  Number and types of 
additional risk minimisation 
measures (aRMM). Who is 
targeted by educational mate-
rial? All products with aRMM 
utilised either educational mate-
rial (EM) for patients, health-
care professionals (HCPs) or for 
both. CA controlled access, CD 
controlled distribution
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or sealants. An example of an injectable is an insulin prod-
uct, for which specific RMMs and guidance to minimise the 
risk of MEs have been developed [22].
Another important finding is the fact that a large pro-
portion of ME safety concerns was only described in the 
EPAR as medication errors, without indicating the exact 
type of ME. Moreover, less than 10% of ME safety concerns 
specified the clinical consequence of the ME. However, it 
is preferable to include the undesirable clinical outcomes 
as a consequence of the ME in the EPAR in addition to 
the ME itself. Further, clearer descriptions of the type of 
ME and its consequences could aid in the development of 
more tailored RMMs and better identification of the target 
population for these RMMs. For example, a safety concern 
as included in the  Lixiana® (edoxaban) RMP (bleeding due 
to inappropriate administration) specifies what the cause is 
for the ME and the clinical consequences of the error. As 
the current good pharmacovigilance practices Module V 
revision 2 states the RMP “should address only the risks 
that are undesirable clinical outcomes … [which] … may be 
linked to situations such as … medication errors”, the conse-
quences of MEs may be better described in the future [10].
A third important finding is that the most common ME 
safety concerns are related to incorrect administration of 
medication. Different ME safety concerns were found in 
medicines of all ATC classes (see the ESM), and it did not 
appear that specific errors were identified more often in 
certain ATC classes. Although some errors were very spe-
cific, e.g. multiple use of medicines intended for single use 
only, others were more general, e.g. administration errors. 
No clear pattern could be identified, which shows that there 
is not one single approach to address and minimise MEs, 
but that a case-by-case review is performed for each new 
medicine.
Fourth, we found that 10.5% of ME safety concerns were 
classified as important identified risks in the EU-RMP. Addi-
tional risk minimisation measures were required for almost 
three-quarters of the ME safety concerns classified as impor-
tant identified risks. While it is preferable that appropriate 
steps are taken to minimise or eliminate the risk of MEs 
prior to drug approval, there may be situations where the risk 
is difficult to resolve before the licensing, e.g. the complex 
administration methods associated with some products. In 
cases where the intended benefits of the product outweigh 
the risks or there is an unmet medical need, appropriate 
measures should be taken to further minimise the risk of 
MEs in the post-marketing setting.
Fifth, when ME safety concerns were classified as 
important potential risks, mainly routine RMMs were used 
to address these potential risks. Medication error safety 
concerns classified as important identified risks received 
aRMMs more often compared to ME safety concerns clas-
sified as important potential risks. This suggests that the 
certainty of the ME risk is a determinant for the necessity of 
an aRMM. In addition, we observed that ME safety concerns 
were more often addressed with aRMMs than all other safety 
concerns of the products. This is in line with recently pub-
lished data showing that MEs are among the safety concerns 
with the highest proportion of aRMMs [13, 14]. An expla-
nation for the higher proportion of aRMMs for ME safety 
concerns compared to all other safety concerns could lie in 
the difference in preventability. Non-ME safety concerns are 
often adverse drug reactions that are intrinsic properties of 
the medicine and are therefore not always preventable in all 
patients. In contrast, MEs are in theory preventable for all 
patients and may benefit more directly from aRMMs. This 
is reflected by the fact that aRMMs were often implemented 
for risks associated with administration or handling of the 
product. Educational material for this type of error often 
consists of a leaflet for HCPs, patients or carers with further 
instructions on how to handle, prepare and administer the 
product. The fact that all aRMMs always consist of educa-
tional material is in line with previous findings [13, 14]. This 
is understandable as it is a useful tool to create awareness 
of risks among HCPs and/or patients, before taking more 
restrictive measures.
Finally, we found that for 78% of products with aRMMs 
for ME safety concerns, studies were in place to measure the 
effectiveness of these measures. The effectiveness of educa-
tional materials is debated and the materials may not always 
have the intended effect [23]. Effectiveness studies are 
important to decide whether RMMs are adequate or should 
be amended, although the execution often remains a chal-
lenge [24–26]. As the aRMMs discussed in this study are 
implemented at the time of the product approval, a compari-
son between before and after implementation of the aRMM 
is not feasible in these cases. Studies focus mainly on the 
observed rate of MEs after marketing. When using spontane-
ous reports for this purpose, underreporting is a known prob-
lem [27]. Identifying the occurrence of MEs may also be a 
challenge when existing electronic healthcare databases are 
used because particular errors (e.g. administration errors) 
can be difficult to identify in such data. Surveys to investi-
gate whether HCPs understand the material may be biased, 
as HCPs who are more aware of the educational material 
may be more inclined to participate in such a survey [28]. 
In addition, it is possible that those who read the material, 
but also experienced the ME, are less likely to participate 
because of social desirability bias. We observed that non-
interventional observational studies, analysis of spontaneous 
reporting data and surveys were most frequently used for 
evaluation of the effectiveness of RMMs for MEs. Despite 
the challenges, these may be the most feasible tools currently 
available for measuring MEs in real life. The advantage of 
spontaneous reporting data is that they can describe a wide 
variety of errors. However, better methods are needed to 
 C. E. Hoeve et al.
study MEs in real life. Improvement may be sought in the 
application of already available digital tools (e.g. bar-code 
scanning).
Our study did not investigate the effectiveness of the 
RMMs. We observed that for most CAPs in our dataset, 
studies to assess the effectiveness of aRMMs for MEs were 
agreed upon. However, only a few effectiveness studies 
concerning MEs have been published in publicly available 
domains [28, 29]. Public availability of these studies could 
help develop new techniques to measure the effectiveness of 
aRMMs and improve outcomes.
4.1  Strengths and Limitations
To our knowledge, this is the first study providing a review 
of ME safety concerns and their planned RMMs. This study 
shows how often ME safety concerns are included as impor-
tant risks in the Summary of Safety Concern of the EU-
RMP and which measures are taken to prevent these risks. 
A review of MEs and their RMMs may support regulators 
and biopharmaceutical medicine developers in future deci-
sion making and product development. Our study also has 
some limitations. The data collected in our study are based 
on EPAR documents publicly available on the EMA web-
site. As these documents contain summarised information, 
data may be missing, e.g. the complete overview of routine 
RMMs. For example, it is not always described whether 
packaging and labelling is used to minimise the risk of ME. 
Therefore, this variable is not included in the study. This 
may have resulted in an underestimation of the efforts to pre-
vent MEs. In addition, details of the studies that are planned 
to evaluate the effectiveness of risk minimisation are not 
always clearly presented in the EPAR. Availability of the 
complete EU-RMP in the public domain could improve data 
analysis. The lack of information in the EPAR was dealt with 
by investigating the original EU-RMPs for products with 
ME safety concerns identified form the EPAR where there 
was missing data. Another limitation of our study is that we 
only included products that had ME safety concerns at the 
moment of authorisation; therefore, we could not address 
MEs that were identified later in the product cycle. Our 
study only focused on risk minimisation of MEs in the EU. 
Other approaches to minimise the risk of MEs may exist in 
other areas and a comparison of approaches between differ-
ent agencies is worth investigating.
5  Conclusions
Our study shows that over a quarter of medicines authorised 
in the EU have MEs as a safety concern in the EU-RMP. The 
high number of products with ME safety concerns and the 
high proportion of ME safety concerns with aRMMs suggest 
awareness regarding MEs at the level of the pharmaceutical 
industry and regulators. There is limited knowledge regard-
ing the effectiveness of the measures available to prevent 
MEs. Therefore, studies are necessary to evaluate the suit-
ability of the current risk minimisation framework for MEs.
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